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The Convenience of the Employer Doctrine
and State Trooper Cash Meal Allowances
Under the Internal Revenue Code:
Commissioner v. Kowalski
In Commissioner v. Kowalski' the United States Supreme Court held
that cash meal allowances paid to state troopers may not be excluded from
gross income. This issue had been litigated before several federal courts of
appeals in a series of decisions known as the "state trooper" cases. Some
circuits held that the payments were excludable2 while other circuits and
the Tax Court held that such allowances must be taxed. After Kowalski
the only remaining nontaxable cash meal allowances are those paid to
certain federal employees.4
The broader significance of Kowalski, however, is the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code. From the earliest
days of taxation under the sixteenth amendment it has been recognized by
the courts and executive branch that some items received by employees are
necessary for the performance of their jobs and should not be taxed. The
resulting "convenience of the employer" doctrine5 has undergone several
1. 434 U.S. 77 (1977). For other student commentary on Kowalski, see Note, I.R.C. § 119 Does
Not Exclude Cash Meal Allowances From Income, 11 CREIGrrON L. REv. 1053 (1978); Note, The
Taxability of Cash Meal Allowances: Form Prevails Over Substance, 38 LA. L. REV. 907 (1978); Note,
24 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 276 (1978); Note, Commissioner v. Kowalski: Eiamination of Cash
Reimbursements to State Troopers for Meals, 5 OHio N.L. REV. 495 (1978); Recent Decision, A Cash
Meal Allowance Received by State Troopers is Includable in Gross Income, 9 TEX. TEcni. L. REV. 776
(1978); Note, Meal Allowancefor State Troopers Not Excludablefront Gross Income, 52TuL L. REV.
650 (1978). See also Case Comment, State Police Subsistence Alloiances and Section 119 of the
Internal Revenue Code, 12 VAL. L. REV. 197 (1977), which predicted the result in Kowalsklon the basis
of United States v. Koerner, 550 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
2. Kowalski v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 686 (3rd Cir. 1976), rev'd, 434 U.S. 77 (1977); United
States v. Smith, 543 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded for firther
consideration, 434 U.S. 978 (1977); United States v. Keeton, 383 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966); United States v. Barrett, 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963);
Saunders v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 768 (3rd Cir. 1954).
3. United States v. Koerner, 550 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977);
Wilson v. United States, 412 F.2d 694(Ist Cir. 1969); Magnessv. Commissioner,247 F.2d740(Sth Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 931 (1958); Ghastin v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 264 (1973); Hyslopc v.
Commissioner, 21 T.C. 131 (1953).
Cases that have followed Kowalski on the issue of cash meal allowances include Friar v. United
States, [1978] FED. TAXES (P-H)(42 A.F.T.R.2d 78-5072) (W.D. Mo. Apr 10, 1978); Cox v. United
States, [1978] FED. TAXES (P-H)(42 A.F.T.R.2d 178-5109)(D. Nev. Mar. 3, 1978); Elliott v. United
States, [1978] FED. TAXEs (P-HX41 A.F.T.R.2d 978-541)(N.D. Ala. Feb. 15, 1978); Bassett v. United
States, [1978] FED. TAXES (P-HX41 A.F.T.R.2d 978-540)(N.D. Ala. Feb. 15, 1978); Cousins v. United
States, [1978] FED. TAXES (P-H)(41 A.F.T.R.2d 978-427)(N.D. Ala. Dec. 30, 1977); Austin v.
Commissioner, 1977 T.C.M. (P-H) 77,434.
4. Cash meal allowances would still be nontaxable under I.R.C. § 912 which excludes certain
allowances paid to federal civilian employees stationed outside the continental United States, and
under Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(b), which excludes subsistence, quarters, and uniform allowances of
members of the armed forces, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and the Public Health Service.
5. The phrase "convenience of the employer" has been used in two ways. It has sometimes been
used to represent ajudicial and administrative doctrine that has roots in the early history of income tax
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changes and is currently codified in section 119 of the Internal Revenue
Code. This Case Comment will examine the way in which the Supreme
Court construed sections 119 and 61 of the 1954 Code and their
relationship to the convenience of the employer doctrine. It will also
attempt to justify the different tax treatment generally accorded state
troopers and armed forces personnel.
I. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. Section 61: Definition of Gross Income
Four sections of the Internal Revenue Code have been applied in the
so-called "state trooper" cases. The first is section 61, which defines gross
income as follows: "[G]ross income means all income from whatever
source derived, including (but not limited to) the following items: (1)
Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, and similar
items .... ,6 A leading case in which the United States Supreme Court
attempted to delineate the contours of section 61 was Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass.7 In that case the Court stated that Congress intended to
use "the full measure of its taxing power" when it drafted section 61,
applying "no limitations as to the source of taxable receipts, nor restrictive
labels as to their nature . . . [in order] to tax all gains except those
specifically exempted."8 Apart from statutory exclusions, the Court held
that if an item of income was an "undeniable accession to wealth, clearly
realized, and over which the [taxpayer had] complete dominion," 9 it was
income.
Despite very broad judicial definitions of income in cases such as
Glenshaw Glass, courts have at other times created exemptions to income.
The convenience of the employer doctrine, which is one example, was first
articulated in Jones v. United States,'0 a case concerning the quarters
allowance of an army officer. The doctrine in general excludes from gross
income meals and lodging provided by the employer in those situations in
which an employee could not do his job without them. The Court of
Claims stated in Jones: "In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is
the established rule not to extend their provisions by implication beyond
the clear import of the language used or to enlarge their operation as to
law and was adopted in the 1954 Code. At issue in Kowalski was whether the 1954 codification served
to exclude the common-law doctrine. The phrase has also been used as one of six requirements of
section 119 which an employee benefit must pass in order to be excluded from taxation. Note,
Dissection of a Malignancy: The Convenience of the Employer Doctrine, 44 NOTRE DAMEt LAW. 1104,
1109, 1113 (1969).
6. I.R.C. § 61(a)(1).
7. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
8. Id. at 429-30.
9. Id. at 431.
10. 60 Ct. Cl. 552 (1925). Other cases often cited for this proposition include Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1925) and Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
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embrace matters pointed out. In case of doubt, they are construed most
strongly against the Government and in favor of the citizen."'
B. Section 119: Meals and Lodging Furnished
for the Convenience of the Employer
The second Code section relevant to Kowalski is section 119, which
excludes meals and lodging furnished for the convenience of the employer
from gross income.' 2 Two of its requirements are pertinent to the state
trooper cases: the benefit must be for the convenience of the employer and
it must be provided on the business premises. After its enactment, it was
unclear whether section 119 was intended to end the judicially created
11. 60 Ct. Cl. at 571-72 (quoting Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 151 (1917)).
12. When Kowalski was decided, I.R.C. § 119 provided:
There shall be excluded from gross income ofany employee the value ofany meats orlodging
furnished to him by his employer, but only if-
(1) in the case of meals, the meals are furnished on the business premises of the employer,
or
(2) in the case of lodging, the employee is required to accept such lodging on the business
premises of his employer as a condition of his employment.
In determining whether meals or lodging are furnished for the convenience of the employer, the
provisions of an employment contract or of a State statute fixing terms ofemployment shall not be
determinative of whether the meals or lodging are intended as compensation.
Congress has recently changed § 119 in two separate acts. First, under a bill to prevent the issuance
of regulations to tax fringe benefits, the original § 119 is now subsection (a) and subsection (bXl) ofthe
statute. Paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (b) are as follows:
(2) Certain factors not taken into account with respect to meals. In determining whether
meals are furnished for the convenience of the employer, the fact that a charge is made for
such meals, and the fact that the employee may accept or decline such meals, shall not be
taken into account.
(3) Certain fixed charge for meals.-
(A) In generaL.-If-
(i) an employee is required to pay on a periodic basis a fixed charge for his meals,
and
(ii) such meals are furnished by the employer for the convenience of the
employer,
there shall be excluded from the employee's gross income an amount equal to such fixed
charge.
(B) Application of subparagraph (A).-Subparagraph (A) shall apply-
(i) whether the employee pays the fixed charge out of his stated compensation or
out of his own funds, and
(ii) only if the employee is required to make the payment whether he accepts or
declines the meals.
The effect of this amendment was to invalidate Treas. Reg. § 1.1 19-1(a)(3)(i) while upholding Treas.
Reg. § 1.1 19-1(a)(3Xii). Fringe Benefits, Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 4,92 Stat. 996 (1978) (amending I.R.C. §
119).
Second, the TaxTreatment Extension Act of 1977 extends the exclusion of§ 119 to thespouse and
dependents of the employee for benefits furnished "by or on behalf of his employer." Pub. L. No. 95-
615, § 205, 92 Stat. 3097 (1978).
In addition, a separate provision, § 3 of the Fringe Benefits law forgives taxes that troopers may
have owed for the years 1970 to 1977. While Kowalski was pendingin thecourts forsixyears, troopers
signed waivers of the three-year statute of limitations on audits, choosing instead to receive refunds or
meal allowance withholdings. As a result, the estimated tax liability for New Jersey troopers for the
period was S4,500,000, an average of S2,000 per member. The maximum liability foran individual was
an estimated S6,006. Jersey Police Get Lenient LI.S. Audits, N.Y. Times, May21,1978, § l,at34,col.
1. A unique feature of this act is that troopers who had paid taxes in good faith for this period were
prohibited from receiving a refund. Fringe Benefits, Pub. L. No. 95427, § 3(bXl), 92 Stat. 996
(1978)(amending I.R.C. § 119).
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convenience of the employer doctrine or whether it was merely intended as
an additional exemption for meals and lodging. It has been said that
"[s]ection 119 of the 1954 Code ended the period of administrative
experimentation (or bungling) with the 'convenience of the employer'
doctrine regarding meals and lodging."'13 The judicial attitude toward
section 119 prior to Kowalski, however, appeared to be that the statute was
merely an addition to the prior law, not a new beginning.14 The courts
placed great reliance on Jones and other early cases as precedent. Two
leading state trooper cases, reaching opposite conclusions, illustrated the
consequences of this judicial preference for case law over statutory law.'$
Morelan v. United States16 was an Eighth Circuit decision allowing an
exclusion under section 119 for the State of Minnesota's three dollars per
diem allowance for meals and other expenses. The court was convinced
that the payments were actually made for the employer's convenience
because of the restrictive conditions under which the allowance was paid.
The state paid only a nominal amount for several items,' 7 strictly
regulating how that amount could be earned. For instance, the trooper
could only receive the allowance for days of active duty and was paid a
different allowance for travel outside his normal patrol area. There were
strict rules about when and where the trooper could eat. Of major
significance to the Eighth Circuit was the state's requirement that troopers
eat in a public place which, according to the court, served the purposes of
displaying the authority of the state, allowing the public to meet its police
force, and dispensing information concerning traffic laws and driving
conditions. 18 The court also had no trouble finding that the business
premises of the highway patrol consisted of the entire State of
Minnesota.' 9
The second leading state trooper case is Wilson v. United States,20
which held that the allowance received by New Hampshire troopers must
be taxed. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit began its analysis by
invoking section 61 and the broad interpretation given it by the federal
courts. Under section 61, exclusions such as those provided by section 119
must be seen as acts of legislative grace and must be narrowly applied.
Furthermore, the court found that a textual analysis of section 119 did not
support an exemption for the cash allowance. The statutory language "the
value of meals . . . furnished to him by his employer . . . on the
13. B. BITKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE, AND GIFT TAXATION 59 (4th cd, 1972).
14. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Kowalski, 544 F.2d 686 (3rd Cir. 1976), discussed at note 34 htfra.
15. Wilson v. United States, 412 F.2d 694 (1 st Cir. 1969); M orelan v. U nited States, 356 F.2d 199
(8th Cir. 1966).
16. 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966).
17. Other expenses included parking meter charges, uniform cleaning, replacement of uniform
accessories, and cost of telephone at home. Id. at 200.
18. See 356 F.2d at 202.
19. Id. at 203. Accord, United States v. Barrett, 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963).
20. 412 F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1969), af'g 292 F. Supp. 200 (D.N.FI. 1968).
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business premises" could not be equivalent to "the cost of meals
reimbursed by the employer purchased in virtually any privately owned
and operated restaurant in the State of New Hampshire."21 The Wilson
court did not reach the issue of the convenience of the employer
requirement. Nevertheless, the opinion did hold that New Hampshire
could not be the business premises of the employer and that when state
troopers were eating in restaurants, they were by definition off duty.
C. Section 120: Exclusion of Statutory Meal Allowances
The third Code section relevant to the issue in Kowalski is section 120
which was repealed in 1958.22 That section specifically excluded state and
local police force meal allowances provided that the allowance was created
by statute, that the exclusion was limited to five dollars per day, and that
there was no separate deduction for the expense, thereby preventing a
double deduction.23 Congress repealed this provision because it was
inequitable to allow only a few to deduct an expense common to so many
and also because police departments were creating meal allowances where
none had existed before.
24
D. Section 162: Deduction of Trade and Business Expenses
A fourth statute, little used in this context, is section 162 which allows
a deduction of certain trade and business expenses from income. Of the
state trooper cases, only Kowalski and Morelan5 used section 162 and
only as an alternative basis to exclusions under section 61 or section 119.
The statute provides:
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business, including- . . . (2) traveling expenses (including amounts
expended for meals and lodging other than amounts which are lavish or
extravagant under the circumstances) while away from home in pursuit of a
26trade or business ....
21. Paraphrasing Wilson v. United States, 292 F. Supp.200, 205 (D. N.H. 1968), aft'd, 412
F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1969).
22. The handful of cases litigated discussed what was a subsistence allowance, who could be
classified as police officers, and whether a later statute could cover a preexisting allowance. United
Statesv. Shirah, 253 F.2d 798(4th Cir. 1958) (definition of subsistence allowance); Wyndham v. United
States, 197 F. Supp. 856 (D. S.C. 1961) (game wardens qualify as policemen); Springer v. United
States, 206 F. Supp. 118 (D. Ore. 1962) (retroactive enactment not effective);Johnson v. United States,
1962 FED. TAXES (P-H) (9 A.F.T.R.2d 62-623) (S.D. Ga. Apr. 24, 1962) (retroactive enactment
effective).
23. Current § 120 excludes "amounts contributed by an employer on behalf of an
employee ...under a qualified group legal services plan ... orthevalueoflegalservicesprovided,
or amounts paid for legal services undera qualified legal services plan .. . ." I.R.C. § 120 was added
by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2134(a), 90 Stat. 1926.
24. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 3, 72 Stat. 1606. H. R. REP.
No. 775, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 7, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4791.
25. Kowalski v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 44 (1975), affd, 434 U.S. 77 (1977); United States v.
Morelan, 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966), affg 237 F. Supp. 879 (D. Minn. 1965).
26. I.R.C. § 162 (a)(2).
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In the leading case of United States v. Correll,27 the Supreme Court upheld
an Internal Revenue Service requirement28 that the travel away from home
include an overnight stay before the expense could be deducted.
II. Commissioner v. Kowalski
A. Facts
Robert J. Kowalski had been a member of the New Jersey State Police
since 1960. When he and his wife filed their joint income tax return for
1970, they reported his income as $9066. Of this, $8,739.38 was his base
salary. The remaining $326.45 was that portion of the meal allowance that
the State of New Jersey had reported on the taxpayer's W-2 Form as
income. New Jersey adopted this reporting procedure on October 1, 1970
on advice from the federal government. The remaining $1,371.09 of the
allowance was not reported. The Internal Revenue Service initially
disallowed a deduction of $405 as a food maintenance expense deduction
and assessed an additional $69 in taxes. After a subsequent discovery of the
unreported portion of the meal allowance, the total deficiency was raised
to $330.70.29
The State of New Jersey considered its meal allowance noncompen-
satory because it was begun in 1949 to replace an inefficient and more
expensive in-kind system which also had been considered noncompen-
satory. Accordingly, the allowance was separated from salary and paid in
advance. By 1970, New Jersey's system of paying cash allowances had
changed substantially and some of its characteristics could no longer be
considered noncompensatory. For example, except for periods of active
duty with the armed forces, the meal allowance was never stopped for
periods of vacation, sick leave, or assignments where meals in kind were
available. Furthermore, troopers were not required to spend their meal
allowances on their mid shift meals, nor were they required to account for
30the manner in which the money was spent.
Kowalski petitioned the United States Tax Court on three grounds:
first, that the allowance was not income within the meaning of section 61;
second, even if it were income, it could be excluded under section 119; and
third, if it were considered income it could be deducted under section 162.
A majority of the court held that the allowance was income and not
excludable under section 119. Nevertheless, since Kowalski had been away
from home overnight for two hundred days on general field, riot, and
recruiting duty, two-thirds of the $1704 maximum allowance was allowed
as a deduction under section 162.31
27. 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
28. I.T. 3395, 1940-2 C.B. 64.
29. Kowalski v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 44, 45-49 (1975) rev'd, 544 F.2d 686 (3rd Cir. 1976),
rev'd, 434 U.S. 77, 79-82 (1977).
30. 65 T.C. at 44-49; 434 U.S. at 79-82.
31. 65 T.C. at 49.
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In a dissenting opinion, one member of the court found the expense
entirely deductible under section 162(a) as an ordinary and necessary
business expense, without regard to whether it was incurred in travel.32
Apparently, the dissent was trying to circumvent the requirement of an
overnight stay upheld by the Supreme Court in Correllfor the deduction of
traveling expenses under section 162(a)(2). A second dissenting opinion
written by Judge Sterrett and joined by five other judges held that the
exclusion should be allowed solely under section 61.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court in
a brief and rather ambiguous opinion 34 that may have been based either on
section 11935 or on section 61.36 The reason for this ambiguity was that the
opinion began by asserting that the meal allowance was excludable under
section 119. Later, however, the opinion stated that the reasons for
exclusion are contained in two section 61 cases: the first state trooper case
to allow an exclusion, Saunders v. Commissioner," and the dissenting
opinion of Judge Sterrett in the Tax Court's decision in Kowalski.
B. Holding
In contrast to the confusion created by the Third Circuit, the Supreme
Court clearly ruled on both the section 61 and section 119 issues. The
Court briefly considered whether section 119 allowed exclusion of a cash
allowance and concluded that the very use of the word "meals" meant that
it did not.38 Chief support for this interpretation was the legislative history
of section 119 and section 1.119-1 of the Treasury Regulations.
The remainder of the opinion discussed in detail why there could be
no cash allowance under a section 61, common-law convenience of the
employer doctrine that existed apart from section 119. First, the Court
traced the history of the doctrine from 1919 through the passage of the
1954 Code. It concluded that the doctrine as developed was fairly well
settled, but had some contradictory features that made it untidy to apply.39
Second, the Court discussed the legislative history of section 119. It held
that this section "comprehensively modified the prior law, both expanding
and contracting the exclusion for meals and lodging previously provided,
and it must therefore be construed as its draftsmen obviously intended it to
32. Id. at 62 (Drennen, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 65 (Sterrett, J., dissenting).
34. 544 F.2d 686 (3rd. Cir. 1976).
35. Brief for Petitioner at 7, 10 LAW REPRINTS, TAX SERIES No. 2, at 53, Commissioner v.
Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977). Note, Meal Allowancesfor State Troopers Not Eyludable From Gross
Income, 52 TUL. L. REv. 650 (1978).
36. Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 82 (1977). Brief for Respondent at 6, 10 LAw
REPRINiTS, TAx SERIES No. 2, at 104, Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977).
37. 215 F.2d 768 (3rd Cir. 1954).
38. 434 U.S. at 84.
39. Id.
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be-as a replacement for the prior law, designed to 'end (its] confusion.'"4 O
Third, the Court rejected a minor argument of the taxpayer that it is
inequitable to allow members of the armed forces to exclude subsistence
and quarters allowances solely under a section 61 regulation,41 while not
allowing similar treatment to cash meal allowances of state troopers. The
Court stated that "arguments of equity have little force in construing the
boundaries of exclusions and deductions from income many of which, to
be administrable, must be arbitrary., 42
In a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice
Blackmun argued that section 162 should allow a deduction of the meal
allowance as an ordinary and necessary expense of travel regardless of the
Court's prior decision in Correll, which required an overnight stay for
meals to be deductible.4 3 He also argued at length that since section 119 has
no express limit to in-kind provisions, cash payments should be exempt.
Significantly, he agreed with the majority that there can be no exclusion
under section 61, thereby dismissing the main argument of the taxpayer,
44
the dissenting opinion of six members of the Tax Court,4 5 and possibly the
opinion of the Third Circuit,46 if the latter is to be construed as based upon
section 61.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Application of Section 119 to Cash Meal Allowances
The Supreme Court in deciding Commissioner v. Kowalski did not
feel compelled to discuss at length why the state trooper's cash meal
allowance could not qualify as an exclusion under section 119 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. In the words of the Court: "By its terms, §
119 covers meals furnished by the employer and not cash reimbursements
for meals. ' 47 Since the Court decides few tax cases and has never before
addressed section 119,48 this exercise of judicial restraint is potentially
disappointing to those who would like to use Kowalski as the definitive
judicial explanation of section 119.
Nevertheless, the Court's more lengthy discussion of why there can be
no exclusion under section 61 is quite useful in explaining its view of
40. Id. at 93 (brackets in original).
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(b) (cited in 434 U.S. at 95).
42. 434 U.S. at 95-96.
43. Id. at 96-98. For a discussion of Correll, see text accompanying note 27 supra. Justice
Blackmun served on the Eighth Circuit court when it decided the state trooper case, United States v.
Morelan, 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966), discussed in text accompanying notes 16-19 supra.
44. Brief of Respondent, 10 LAW REPRINTS, TAX SERIES No. 2, at 98, Commissioner v. Kowalski,
434 U.S. 77 (1977).
45. 65 T.C. at 65 (1975).
46. 544 F.2d 686, 687 (3rd Cir. 1976).
47. 434 U.S. at 84.
48. Justice Harlan, however, did use § 119 as an example of a statutory exclusion in his
concurring opinion in Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269, 273 (1962),
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section 119. That discussion presented a straightforward interpretation of
the legislative history and construed the two components of the statute
49pertinent to the state trooper cases.
1. The Legislative History of Section 119
The most significant step in the development of the convenience of the
employer doctrine was the enactment of section 119 of the 1954 Code. The
House of Representatives originally constructed section 119 to read:
There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the value of
any meals or lodging furnished to him by his employer (whether or not
furnished as compensation) but only if-
(1) such meals or lodging are furnished at the place of employment, and
(2) the employee is required to accept such meals or lodging at the place
of employment as a condition of his employment.
50
The apparent purpose of the House was to discard altogether the term
"convenience of the employer" and begin anew. The then current state of
the law was objectionable because the Internal Revenue Service and the
courts would not exclude the benefit from income "even though the
employee must accept such meals and lodging in order to properly perform
his duties."'"
The Senate, however, found the new two-part test to be ambiguous
.because it rejected any determination whether an item was compensatory
or noncompensatory. The Senate proposed to keep the term "convenience
of the employer," calling it "the basic test of exclusion."5 2 If a benefit were
found to be for the employee's convenience, it could not be excluded. In the
conference committee report, the House acceded to the Senate's version,
which now comprises subsection (a) and paragraph (b) (1) of section 119."
Both houses, however, agreed on other points. First, the purpose of
section 119 was to "end the confusion as to the tax status of meals and
lodging furnished an employee by the employer."5 4 Second, the exclusion
was limited to benefits in kind.5' Third, the benefits must be provided on
the business premiseg of the employer.56 Finally, the phrase "convenience
49. 434 U.S. at 90-95.
50. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 119 (1954).
51. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1954) reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CoNG.
& AD. NEws 4017, 4175 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
52. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1954), reprinted in[1954] U.S. CoDECo.G. &AD.
NEws 4621, 4649 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
53. H.R. RP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1954), reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONo. &
AD. NEws 5280, 5286 [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT].
54. HousE REPORT, supra note 51, at 18, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG;. & AD. NEWS at
4042; SENATE REPORT, supra note 52, at 19, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CoNo. &AD.NEwsat4649.
55. HousE REPORT, supra note 51, at 39, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
4175; SENATE REPORT, supra note 52, at 190-91, reprinted in[1954] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS at
4825.
56. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note53, at27, reprintedin [1954] U.S. CODE CONO. &AD. NEWS
at 5286.
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of the employer" was not to be defined. Instead, the reports of the House,
Senate, and conference committee gave several examples in which a
taxpayer would meet all the necessary conditions. :
A major contribution of Kowalski may be in ending the conflicting
interpretations of the legislative history by favoring a straightforward view
and providing some additional explanations to ambiguous ideas presented
in the congressional reports. For example, the technical appendix to the
Senate report stated that"cash allowances for meals or lodging received by
an employee will continue to be includable in gross income to the extent
that such allowances constitute compensation."'8 The Eighth Circuit held
in Morelan v. United States,59 the Minnesota state trooper case, that since
the state did not classify its allowances as compensation, they were
excludable from income. A second interpretation of this statement was
made by the taxpayer in Kowalski, who claimed that the report "by
negative implication .. . [created] a class of noncompensatory cash
meal payments."' In contrast to these two views, the Court in Kowalski
agreed with the government that "it is much more reasonable to assume
that the cryptic statement . ..was meant to indicate only that meal
allowances otherwise deductible under section 162(a)(2) [as traveling
expenses] .. .were not affected by § 119.,,61 The Court reasoned that if
cash meal allowances were excludable merely at the convenience of the
employer, "then cash would be more widely excluded from income than
meals in kind, an extraordinary result given the presumptively compen-
satory nature of cash payments and the obvious intent of § 119 to narrow
the circumstances in which meals could be excluded. 62 The Court's
rejection of the two questionable interpretations is valid. The intent of
Congress to end the confusion would not be served if section 119 were not
comprehensive.
57. See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 51, at A39, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONO. &AD.
NEws at 4175-76, which gives the following examples:
(I) A civil-service employee ofa State is employed at an institution and is required, as a
condition of his employment, to live and eat at the institution in order to be available for duty
at anytime. Under the applicable State statute, his meals and lodging are regarded as a part of
the employee's compensation. The employee would nevertheless be entitled to exclude the
value of such meals and lodging from gross income.
(2) An employee of an institution is given the choice of residing at the institution free of
charge, or of residing elsewhere and receiving an allowance of $30 per month in addition to
regular salary. If he elects to reside at the institution the value to the employee of the lodging
furnished by the employer will be includable in gross income, because his residence at the
institution is not required as a condition of his employment.
These examples were adapted almost exactly as written in Treas. Reg. § 1.1 19-1(d) as examples (5) and
(6). T.D. 6220, 1957-1 C.B. 34, 58, renumbered by T.D. 6745, 1964-2 C.B. 42, 45-46.
58. SENATE REPORT, supra note 52, at 190-91, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODH CoNo. & AD. Naws
at 4825.
59. 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966).
60. 434 U.S. at 92.
61. Id. at 94-95.
62. Id. at 94.
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The taxpayer in Kowalski presented a second view of the legislative
history to support his contention that cash allowances are not taxable
under section 61. He argued that the acquiescence of the House to the
Senate on the language of section 119 including the phrase "convenience of
the employer" signified a legislative affirmation of a separate common-law
convenience of the employer doctrine, excluding conflicting glosses found
in cases and rulings arising just prior to the passage of the 1954 Code.63
According to the Kowalski Court, although the Senate did choose to reject
these decisions and to retain the convenience of the employer doctrine, the
Senate modified the doctrine in three steps. First, section 119 explicitly
rejected employer's characterization in its last clause; in its place, "business
necessity" was intended to limit "convenience" as defined in Van Rosen v.
64Commissioner. In that case, which was brought under the 1939 Code, the
Tax Court refused to extend the exclusion of cash allowances granted to
military personnel in Jones v. United States to civilian employees of the
federal government. The court held that the proper test of exclusion was
whether the taxpayer was unable to take, to appropriate, to use, or to
spend the allowance in accordance with his own preferences. Second, the
Senate and conference reports provided specific examples to show when
the proper conditions were present to allow exclusion. 5 Third, the Senate
adopted the House's "business premises" restriction, a new requirement
for the convenience of the employer doctrine.66
This view of the legislative history of section 119 is presented in a
section of the opinion that is terse and difficult to analyze. Nevertheless, an
understanding of this portion is necessary to fully comprehend the highly
quotable summary of the Court that the statute "comprehensively
modified the prior law, both expanding and contracting the exclusion for
meals and lodging previously provided, and . . . must therefore be
construed as its draftsmen obviously intended it to be-as a replacement
for the prior law, designed to 'end [its] confusion.' " 67
2. The Construction of Section 119
Perhaps the most direct guidance of the Supreme Court will come
from its validation of Treasury Regulation section 1.119-1(c)(2) which
states that the "exclusion provided by section 119 applies only to meals and
lodging furnished in kind." 6 This requirement that the benefits be in kind
63. See Saunders v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 768 (3rd Cir. 1954) (state trooper cash meal
allowances excludable); Doran v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 374 (1953) (state statute determinative of
compensatory nature of lodging); Mim. 6472, 1950-1 C.B. 15 (business purpose not determinative of
excludability).
64. 17 T.C. 834 (1951).
65. See note 57 supra.
66. 434 U.S. at 93.
67. Id.
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1 (c)(2) (emphasis added).
1979]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNA L.
found support in the use of "meals" in the statute and in specific restrictions
in the legislative history to benefits in kind. Presumably, the Court also
deferred to a reasonable administrative determination amplifying the
specific language of the statute.
69
The Court, unfortunately, did not provide a new and more useful
definition of the convenience of the employer requirement as it appears in
section 119. It did conclude that in choosing that phrase as a requirement
in the statute, Congress "obviously intended to adopt the meaning of that
term as it had developed over time"70 except to the extent that prior
definitions would be inconsistent with other requirements of section 119.
The Court pointed out that Van Rosen v. Commissioner,7t which used a
business-necessity rationale, provided the controlling court definition at
the tithe of the 1954 recodification. The rationale in Van Rosen, therefore,
was endorsed by the Supreme Court as the meaning of convenience of the
employer as it is used in section 119. In Van Rosen the Tax Court stated:
[T]hough there was an element of gain to the employee, in that he received
subsistence and quarters which otherwise he would have had to supply for
himself, he had nothing he could take, appropriate, use and expend according
to his own dictates, but rather, the ends of the employer's business dominated
and controlled, just as in the furnishing of a place to work and in the
supplying of the tools and machinery with which to work. The fact that
certain personal wants and needs of the employee were satisfied was plainly
secondary and incidental to the employment.
Ironically, this was the very definition upon which the Third Circuit had
relied in the first state trooper case to justify an exclusion." In contrast to
the lower court, the Supreme Court's reliance on Van Rosen is significant
in the way it imposes restrictions on the convenience of the employer
doctrine. Through Van Rosen, the Court provided a narrower criterion
with which to define the limits of convenience and may have prevented the
lower courts from ignoring the provision of section 119 that employer's
characterization is irrelevant as a test of exclusion. Neither an employer's
whim nor mistaken idea that meals serve a business purpose governs the
granting of the exclusion. Rather, it is solely a question of practicality.
69. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967).
70. 434 U.S. at 93.
71. 17 T.C. 834 (1951).
72. Id. at 838 (quoted in434 U.S. at88 n.21). Although the case is an excellent piece of reasoning,
-Van Rosen predated § 119 and was brought under § 22(a) of the 1939 Code (predecessor of the current §
61). Perhaps the best statement available from a case that treated § 119 was made by Judge Rosenn In
his dissenting opinion in Jacob v. United States, 493 F.2d 1294, 1300 (3rd Cir. 1974) (emphasis In
original). If the employee had control over "the time, duration, value, and content of the meals and he
could adjust these factors to suit his own convenience," then the benefit was clearly outside the
convenience of the employer doctrine. The Third Circuit's opinion in Kowalski v. Commlssioner, 544
F.2d 686, 687 (3d Cir. 1976), consists mostly of a quotation from the majority opinion in Jacob. Jacob,
in turn, is based principally upon the state trooper cases.
73. Saunders v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 768, 774 (3rd Cir. 1954).
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A major weakness, of Kowalski is that it does not resolve the
continued conflict among the federal courts over the limits of business
premises. The failure to define these limits is particularly troublesome
given one of the examples from the Treasury Regulations which defines
business premises for a cowhand as the rented government land on which
he is herding his employer's cattle.74 The cases favorable to exclusion of
state trooper allowances envisioned the entire state as the premises;75 the
others found that construction farfetched.7 6 The Supreme Court in
Kowalski concluded that the phrase "on the business premises of the
employer" was added by the Senate as a means of restricting the
application of the doctrine." Presumably, only the headquarters post of
the state police would qualify, although the opinion does not so state.
Thus, there is left open to the states the possibility that they could provide
box lunches to all troopers to meet the new requirements of Kowalski.7'
Would the patrol car or roadside rest stop qualify as the business premises?
If Kowalski is interpreted as approving Wilson v. United States," the New
Hampshire state trooper case, neither patrol cars nor rest stops would be
considered business premises.
B. The Common-Law Convenience of the Employer Doctrine
of Section 61
In reading Commissioner v. Kowalski, it is easy to focus solely on the
construction that the Supreme Court gave to section 119. After its initial
determination that cash meal allowances could not be excluded under
section 119, the Court then used that section to narrow an exception to
gross income, thereby obscuring the fact that the discussion concerned
section 61. Section 61 is not merely a philosophical premise that asserts
that Congress has broad power to tax "all income from whatever source
derived," but also a substantive requirement. Denoting an item as not
being income, therefore, can place it outside the taxing power of the
Internal Revenue Code.
1. Judicial and Administrative Developments Through 1954:
Convenience, Compensation, Characterization, Cash, and Confusion
The phrase "convenience of the employer" dates from the early days
of modem income taxation under the sixteenth amendment. The phrase
was first used in 1919 when the Internal Revenue Service ruled that the
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-(c)(1).
75. United States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966); United States v. Barrett, 321 F.2d
911 (5th Cir. 1963).
76. Wilson v. United States, 412 F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1969).
77. 434 U.S. at 93.
78. It has also been suggested that meal tickets issued for use in restaurants may meet the new
standards of Kowalski. Note, supra note 35, at 656.
79. 412 F.2d 694 (Ist Cir. 1969).
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value of food and lodging received by seamen aboard ship could be
excluded from taxable income.'s Shortly thereafter the idea was adopted
generally in the Treasury Regulations81 where it remained until passage of
the 1954 Code.8 2 Throughout the doctrine's history, decisions affecting the
exclusion of either meals or lodging would have an effect on the exclusion
of the other.
The only generally agreed upon standard for excluding items given for
the "convenience of the employer" was that the benefit had to be
noncompensatory. That is, it could not appear to be given in exchange for
the labor of the employee. Whether the benefit was noncompensatory was
generally determined by one of two conflicting tests. Under identical
circumstances, one taxpayer would be allowed an exclusion under the first
test, but another taxpayer would be denied an exclusion if the alternate test
were applied.83 The first test considered "employer's characterization." An
early ruling held that the lodging of federal Indian Service employees was
to be included in income if it were paid from an account appropriated by
Congress for the payment of compensation. 4 In contrast, the second test
determined whether the benefit served a valid "business purpose." In
separate decisions, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that cannery
workers 5 and hospital employees86 could exclude the value of meals and
quarters furnished to them on the business site. By 1940, business purpose
was the generally accepted test.
8 7
The landmark case for allowing the exclusion of the value of lodging
received in kind was Benaglia v. Commissioner.8 As the manager of a
hotel, the taxpayer was required by his employer to be on the premises at
all times. His accommodations were clearly "not by way of compensation
for his services, not for his personal convenience, comfort, or pleasure, but
solely because he could not otherwise perform the services required of
him."8 9
Under either test, after the meals or lodging had been determined to be
noncompensatory, there was a second inquiry: whether cash was an
acceptable substitute for the benefit conferred. In the earliest ruling on this
second question, it was held that cash payments for supper money to
employees who worked voluntarily after normal hours could be excluded
80. O.D. 265, 1 C.B. 71 (1919).
81. T.D. 2992, 2 C.B. 76 (1920).
82. Treas. Reg. 103, § 9.22(a)-3, Mim. 5023, 1940-1 C.B. 14.
83. Compare Doran v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 374 (1953) (state law determinative of
compensatory nature of lodging) with Diamond v. Sturr, 221 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1955) (state law not
determinative of compensatory nature of lodging).
84. O.D. 914, 4 C.B. 85 (1921).
85. O.D. 814, 4 C.B. 84 (1921).
86. O.D. 915, 4 C.B. 85 (1921).
87. Mim. 5023, 1940-1 C.B. 14.
88. 36 B.T.A. 838 (1937).
89. Id. at 839.
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from taxation.90 In the first convenience of the employer case, Jones v.
United States,91 the Court of Claims agreed. The taxpayer was an army
officer stationed at Fort Monroe in Virginia who had been temporarily
assigned to Washington, D.C. for four months. The Internal Revenue
Service sought to tax not only the cash payments he received for the
temporary quarters he rented in Washington but also the value of the
quarters furnished in kind at his permanent duty station.92 First, the court
examined in detail more than a century of army regulations regarding the
furnishing of quarters and concluded that congressional purpose would be
severely thwarted were the court to hold quarters taxable. The regulations
constituted an "employer's characterization" and also demonstrated the
military necessity of providing quarters. Second, the court noted that
several of the early revenue acts specifically exempted the income of federal
officials such as the President and judges and therefore it was well within
the power of Congress to exclude others. Finally, relying on Eisner v.
Macomber,93 the court held that the cash allowance for quarters was not
income derived from labor and could not be taxed.
While the Treasury soon acceded to Jones in the case of military
allowances, the exclusion was not extended to other classes of taxpayers.
The leading case under the 1939 Code was Van Rosen v. Commissioner9 5
in which the Tax Court rejected the exclusion of a quarters and messing
cash allowance to a civilian employee of the Army. The taxpayer was paid
the allowance in lieu of closed shipboard facilities he would have occupied
had they not been under repair. He lived at home in conditions no different
from any other taxpayer who had a nondeductible personal expense.
Three decisions issued by the government, the Tax Court, and a
circuit court illustrate that while it was generally agreed that "convenience
of the employer" meant objective business purpose and could not cover
cash allowances, there was no uniformity in the application of these tests.
A 1950 ruling by the Internal Revenue Service stated:
The "convenience of the employer" rule is simply an administrative test to be
applied only in cases in which the compensatory character of such benefits is
not otherwise determinable. It follows that the rule should not be applied in
any case in which it is evident from the other circumstances involved that the
receipt of.quarters or meals by the employee represents compensation for
services rendered.96
Although the purpose of the ruling was to narrow exclusions, it was not
90. O.D. 514, 2 C.B. 90 (1920).
91. 60 Ct. CL 552 (1925).
92. Id. at 553.
93. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
94. Mim. 3413, V-I C.B. 29 (1926).
95. 17 T.C. 834 (1951).
96. Mim. 6472, 1950-1 C.B. 15.
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widely adopted by the courts.9 In Doran v. Commissioner,98 the Tax
Court returned to employer's characterization as the principal determina-
tion of excludability. The employer in that case, the State of South
Carolina, classified an employee's lodging as compensation and therefore
the value of the lodging was held to be taxable. 99 "Convenience of the
employer" and "compensation" were not mutually exclusive categories,
according to the court, and therefore a benefit could be conferred for the
employer's convenience and still be taxable.
The third development occurred in the first state trooper case to be
appealed, Saunders v. Commissioner.100 The Tax Court had held that tie
New Jersey cash meal allowance was reimbursement for a personal living
expense. While the duties of troopers were military in nature, the troopers
were civilians and the exclusion granted to military personnel could not be
extended to them. °10 The Third Circuit reversed on the ground that the
meal allowance was an equivalent substitution for the in-kind system that
New Jersey had previously used. Since the in-kind system had been
noncompensatory, it was clear to the court that the allowance was also
noncompensatory. Unlike the Tax Court, the Third Circuit was persuaded
that the military nature of state police duties justified treating troopers
differently from other taxpayers: without accepting the meals, the
taxpayer could not perform his duties. 1
02
2. Kowalski and Section 61
In Kowalski the Supreme Court's discussion of the judicial and
administrative development of the convenience of the employer doctrine
formed a major portion of the Court's opinion. The Court examined the
major rulings and cases and gave them a reasonable interpretation in light
of its conclusion that "the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine is not a
tidy one."'10 3
The Court, in setting forth its lengthy history,104 intended to achieve
one purpose-to show the need for congressional action in a confused area
of the law. This purpose would seem unnecessary given the legislative
history of section 119. But this judicial/administrative history serves a
necessary second purpose that the Court did not emphasize-to show that
the development of a section 61 doctrine excluding meals and lodging from
income ended in 1954. This exposition was necessary because the taxpayer
97. Note, supra note 5, at 1118.
98. 21 T.C. 374 (1953).
99. Id. at 376.
100. 215 F.2d 768 (3rd Cir. 1954).
101. 21 T.C. 630, 634 (1954).
102. 215 F.2d at 774.
103. 434 U.S. at 84.
104. This history is similar to that given above and in other cases and commentaries, See, e.g.,
Diamond v. Sturr, 221 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1955).
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in Kowalski had based his case on a section 61 argument, as well as on
sections 119 and 162. Only once in the twenty years since theenactment of
section 119 had section 61 ever been mentioned in a case dealing with the
convenience of the employer doctrine. The case was Barrett v. United
States,10 5 the first state trooper case decided under the 1954 Code, which
held that cash allowances were nontaxable. Despite this absence ofjudicial
development, Kowalski argued that the common-law exclusion was still
viable.'0 6 Although this argument was rejected by the Tax Court, six
dissenting judges agreed. Moreover, the vague per curiam decision of the
Third Circuit in Kowalski may be read to support an exclusion based on
section 61.
Kowalski was more than another state trooper case; it opened up for
argument an area of law deemed closed by every court for two decades. If
the Court had denied certiorari or ruled in favor of the taxpayer, it might
have perpetuated two distinct and contradictory convenience of the
employer doctrines, one legislative, the other judicial. The section 119
doctrine, restricted to employees eating meals provided by their employers
at their place of business, is consonant with the Court's earlier decisions,
such as Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,' °7 which declared that
Congress has broad taxing powers. The judicial doctrine, on the other
hand, allowed an employer to create a tax-free benefit so long as he could
claim it served a business purpose.
The government argued in Kowalski that for the Court to sustain the
taxpayer would cause great revenue losses. 18 This seems unlikely because
the state trooper exemption has never been extended to other classes of
taxpayers for cash allowances and because the courts have not
automatically excluded all in-kind benefits.' 0 9 Ruling in favor of the
taxpayer, however, would have severely confused this area of the law by
allowing the courts to use the Third Circuit's decision in Kowalski to
justify exclusions on a case by case basis without rigorous legal reasoning,
which was the main problem during the years before passage of the 1954
Code.
At the other extreme, it is unlikely that other exemptions based on
section 61 are invalidated by Kowalski as the taxpayer had argued." 0 The
list of nontaxable items presented by Judge Sterrett of the Tax Court in his
105. 205-F. Supp. 307 (S.D. Miss. 1962), aff'd, 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963).
106. Brief for Respondent at 18, 10 LAw REPRITrs, TAX SERIES No. 2, at 116, Commissionerv.
Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977).
107. 348 U.S. 426 (1955). For further discussion of Glenshaw Glass, see text accompanying
note 7 supra.
108. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, 10 LAw REPRITS, TAX SERIEs No.2, at 8, Commis-
sioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977).
109. Tougher v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 737 (1969), afj'dper curium, 441 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971) (groceries from FAA commissary on Wake Island are taxable).
110. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, 10 LAw REPRIThS, TAX SERIES
No. 2, at 35, Commissioner v. Kowalsi, 434 U.S. 77 (1977).
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dissenting opinion and repeated by the taxpayer before the Supreme
Court'11 were quarters allowances for army officers, "12 meal allowances for
state troopers,1 3 food and lodging for institutional and hotel employees,"1
4
an expense paid trip to Germany,'" and food and lodging expenses
incurred in moving." 6 Each of these categories is either based on a case
antedating the 1954 Code and therefore questionable as precedent, is
adequately covered under a current Code section, or is an unusual
exception in its own area of the tax law. The following points should be
noted with respect to these categories. First, the Court in Kowalski held
that state troopers and, by implication institutional and hotel employees,
must meet the requirements of section 119.117 Second, the Kowalski Court
also gave tacit approval to the exclusion of military allowances under
Treasury Regulations section 1.61-2(b). In previous cases, the Court has
stated explicitly that when a regulation or interpretation has stood without
substantial change for several years, the regulation is presumed to have
congressional approval. 18 For the military allowance exclusion to rest
solely on a regulation is inelegant but not fatal. Third, the courts prior to
Kowalski generally have not allowed the exclusion of expense paid trips."t9
Last, moving expenses for food and lodging are deductible under the 1954
Code.12
C. Kowalski as Determinative of the State Trooper Cases:
The Military Analogy
The foregoing two parts of this analysis have discussed how the
Supreme Court interpreted the Internal Revenue Code. This part discusses
the Court's treatment of the narrow issue of whether state trooper meal
allowances should be taxed.
Prior decisions had usually discussed the arduous nature of the duties
of state troopers and on that basis either extended the exclusion granted to
the allowances of military personnel to state troopers or found the
comparison unpersuasive.' 2 1 At only one point in its opinion does the
111. 65 T.C. at 65; Brief for Respondent at 11, 10 LAw REPRINis, TAX SHRmS No, 2, at 109,
Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977).
112. Bercaw v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1948); Jones v. United States, 60 Ct, CI.
552 (1925).
113. United States v. Barrett, 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963); Saunders v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d
768 (3rd Cir. 1954).
114. Diamond v. Sturr, 221 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1955); Benaglia v. Commissioner, 36 B.TA, 838
(1937).
115. United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1968).
116. Cavanagh v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 300 (1961).
117. 434 U.S. at93.
118. See, e.g., United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 305 (1967)
119. See, e.g., Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269 (1962). Conra, United States v. Goteher,
401 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1968).
120. I.R.C. § 217(b)(1).
121. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
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Kowalski Court attempt a similar approach. The taxpayer had argued that
it was inequitable to allow armed forces personnel to exclude their
subsistence and quarters allowances when state troopers could not. The
Court's reasoning was that equity is not applicable to tax questions and
that repeal of section 120,122 which had specifically excluded certain state
and local police force meal allowances, was indicative of prior
congressional consideration of this problem. 2 3
Undoubtedly it was unnecessary for the Court in reaching its decision
to consider the duties of state troopers, given its narrow view of section
119. Nevertheless, in answering the taxpayer as it did, the Court is
vulnerable to the attack used by Justice Blackmun in his dissenting
opinion. For example, Justice Blackmun indicated that the Treasury
Regulations, as the sole basis of exclusion for armed forces cash
allowances, are "a thin and weak support for recognizing a substantial
benefit for the military and denying it for the New Jersey state trooper
counterpart."' 24 This type of attack assumes that not only are the duties of
state troopers similar to those of military personnel, but so are the methods
of and reasons for paying their respective allowances. This easily made
assumption is unwarranted since nowhere in the literature concerning the
state trooper cases has there been a direct comparison of the Department
of Defense pay and allowances system with the allowance system of any
state. Examining the opinions of the Tax Court and of the Supreme Court
in Kowalski, this writer has found twelve grounds on which the New Jersey
state trooper subsistence allowance may be distinguished from that paid to
enlisted members of the armed forces. This section of the Case Comment
will discuss several of these differences, demonstrating that while the
armed forces system is largely noncompensatory, the system evolved by
New Jersey was definitely compensatory.1
25
122. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 3, 72 Stat. 1606.
123. 434 U.S. at 94.
124. Id. at 98.
125. The system used in New Jersey is described in 434 U.S. at 79-80 and 65 T.C. at 45-49. For
statutes concerning military compensation, seeTitles 10 and 37 of the United States Code. Regulations
pertinent to all military services are found in the DEPARTMENT OF DErENSE MILITARY PAY AN4D
ALLOWANCES ErTrrLEMENTs MANUAL (1979) [hereinafter cited as DODPM]. For examples of more
specific branch regulations, see the NAVY PAY AND PERSONNEL PROCEDURES MANUAL(1979) (NAVSO
P-3050) and the BUREAU OFNAVAL PERSONNEL MANUAL(1979) (NAVPERS 15791B) [hereinafter cited
as BUPERSMAN]. Regulations found in the Code of Federal Regulations are sketchy and in some
instances out of date. Compare 32 C.F.R. § 715.6 (1976) (enlisted naval personnel E-3 and below
required to make allotment of pay to dependents) with BUPERSMAN 6210120 (allotments not
required). Where not otherwise documented, the author's experiences as a personnel management
specialist in the U.S. Navy form the basis of comparison.
There are differences between the New Jersey system and that used by the armed services which are
of less value in assessing the nature of the formersystem. First, NewJersey paid its troopers in advance
while service members receive pay only as they earn it. 37 U.S.C. §§ 402(b), 1006 (1976); DODPM
40103, Table 4-1-I, Rules 8-9. Second, the New Jersey allowance was kept separate from other items
of pay. Only recently has payroll computerization by the armed services enabled separate statement of
all allowances. Third, there is a material difference in the amounts paid.The maximum payable inNew
Jersey in 1970 for the mid-shift meal was S143 per month. The enlisted allowance for 1970 for three
meals was only S76.95 per month when messing in kind was not available. 37 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1970).
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First, the Department of Defense provides that because rations in
kind are preferred, an affirmative act is required to start payment of
subsistence allowances. 26 Whenever government, messing is certified as
available, no cash payments are made. Example of periods of nonpayment
include hospitalization, 27 confinement,'28 leave,129 or travel.1 30 When
there is no indication whether messing was available, there is a
presumption that it was. In contrast, New Jersey paid its troopers on a
continual basis, whether they were on duty, off duty, or on vacation.
Second, the two systems have different roles in personnel procure-
ment. Although New Jersey did not intend that its meal allowance be
regarded as compensation, the state police recruiting brochure used the
allowance to entice prospective troopers.' 3' The promise of tax-free
allowances is not part of first term armed forces recruiting, although such
incentives as comprehensive medical care for members and their
dependents are promoted. Comparable benefits may not be available to
civilian police departments.
Third, the rates of military and state trooper subsistence allowances
are determined differently. Military allowances are established by
Congress, 32 which is subject to diverse political pressures. By contrast,
New Jersey established its rates through collective bargaining with the
union that represented the troopers.
Fourth, the armed forces distinguish only between officer and
enlisted allowances and the amount given to enlisted personnel is
greater. 33 In contrast, New Jersey allowances increased with rank. An
increase in privileges with the rank attained may be a valid tool of
management, but it conflicts with the idea that such allowances are
noncompensatory.
Fifth, the military pension system uses only base pay to calculate
retirement benefits. 34 New Jersey, in sharp contrast, included the
subsistence allowance. Presumably, the working conditions that
necessitate an allowance cease upon retirement. The inclusion of the
Finally, in New Jersey, a cash allowance is more practical. The provision of meals in kind is the only
method possible for use under combat conditions and normal sea duty.
126. 37 U.S.C. § 402(1976); DODPM,supra note 125, 30111; BUPERSMAN,supra note 125,
2640100.
127. DODPM, supra note 125, Table 3-1-6, Rule 3.
128. Id. Rule 6.
129. BUPERSMAN, supra note 125, 2640140.
130. DODPM, supra note 125, Table 3-1-5, Rule 1.
131. A discrepancy exists between the characterization of this brochure by the Tax Court and
the Supreme Court. Compare 65 T.C. at 47 ("On the advertising brochure the meal allowance Is
described as an item to be received in addition to the base salary.") vith 434 U.S. at 80 ("an item of
salary to be received in addition to an officer's base salary . . .") (emphasis added).
132. 37 U.S.C. §§ 1008-1009 (1976).
133. Officers receive $62.80 per month while enlisted personnel receive $90.00 per month,
Exec. Order No. 12,087, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,823 (1978).
134. 10 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976); BUPERSMAN, supra note 125, 2630100.
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allowance in pensions is a reflection that the state and its troopers were
misusing a tax provision to increase compensation.
Sixth, the number of personnel affected varies greatly. The total
number of troopers in New Jersey is only fifteen hundred. The Navy alone
has over one-half million men and women in uniform. The vast scope of its
operations enables the federal government to use efficient means of
disbursement control which would be unavailable or impractical for use by
the states. The seventh distinction follows from this difference in size: to
improve personnel management efficiency in its huge military operations,
the federal government has necessarily established large bureaucracies
with elaborate rules governing each duty situation that may arise. It is
likely that New Jersey paid its allowances continuously without regard for
actual meals consumed in order to keep accounting expenses low. 35
The eighth, and probably most important, distinction is based on the
source of benefit: the federal government on the one hand, as opposed to
the states or private employers on the other. This difference has been noted
in other cases,1 36 and while perhaps unfair, explains the different treatment
of the two classes more readily than very narrow distinctions predicated
upon "convenience" to the employer or the employee. It is also a
meaningful distinction because both the executive and legislative branches
of the federal government provide controls over disbursement of
subsistence allowances that New Jersey does not. For example, the Navy's
district commandants and base commanders issue very specific
supplemental directives to naval regulations. 137 The General Accounting
Office also audits local practices for Congress. Such controls are highly
unlikely to be instituted by Congress for state police expenditures.
There are, however, compensatory features common to both systems
that make this comparison of differences less than perfect. In both
organizations members have wide discretion over the quality and content
of meals purchased with the allowance but must obtain formal permission
to begin each meal. Moreover, the allowance is not intended by the
employer as compensation, although members may perceive it as such.
Under the two systems, members are subject to emergency recall at any
time. Three similarities in particular are inconsistent with the noncompen-
satory intent of both employers: allowances are paid in cash, employees are
not required to purchase food with the allowance, and employees are not
required to account for expenditures.
These similarities, however, are not persuasive. The eight differences
are sufficient to show that New Jersey did not do a very good job of
135. Keeton v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 576 (D. Colo. 1966), af 'd, 383 F.2d 429 (10th Cir.
1967).
136. See, e.g., Benaglia v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 838, 842 (1937) (Arnold, Member,
dissenting).
137. See, e.g., Dep't of the Navy, Commandant, Third Naval District, "Basic Allowance
for Subsistence (BAS) for Enlisted Personnel; control procedures for" (COMTHREEINST
7220. 11B).
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creating a noncompensatory cash allowance system. To a limited extent,
the Court agreed when it held that even if a convenience of the employer
doctrine survived the 1954 Code, the facts of Kowalski do not meet the
standards established by Van Rosen and Saunders.
138
IV. CONCLUSION
In its narrowest sense, Commissioner v. Kowalski is the resolution of
a difference between the federal courts of appeals on an issue of tax law.
Perhaps the result that cash allowances for meals may not be excluded
from gross income under section 119 is too sweeping if it removes
exclusions not only for generous compensatory systems like New Jersey,
but also for genuinely noncompensatory systems. From that viewpoint,
the hairsplitting engaged in by some courts to justify different results from
prior decisions was proper.'3 9 But even assuming that section 119 excludes
cash allowances as well as benefits in kind, reversal of the Third Circuit's
brief, unanalytical opinion was necessary because -that court had shown
itself incapable of distinguishing between compensatory and noncompen-
satory systems. Kowalski is a proper decision because it prevents decisions
that allow employer and employee to collude under a common-law
convenience of the employer doctrine.*
Kowalski was also a vehicle for the Court to interpret the Internal
Revenue Code. Construing the intent of Congress, it held that section 119
may be used in only a limited number of circumstances. It is now clear that
section 119 does not cover cash payments. More importantly, section 61
cannot be used to create exclusions when Congress has preempted the
matter by another statute. Further, because of its broad nature, section 61
may not be used to create an exemption when no statute yet -exists.
Whatever the differences of opinion among the members of the Supreme
Court concerning section 119, the Court was unanimous in its
interpretation of section 61.
Larry D. Rhodebeck
138. 434 U.S. at 95.
139. See, e.g., Ghastin v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 264 (1973).
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